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INTRODUCTION

Does a State really have exclusive and unquestioned jurisdiction to
determine its nationality? England has become so accustomed to the novelty
of witnessing renewed excursions into immigration control, that the use of
nationality law concepts to achieve such ends is no longer being questioned.
Yet in most other countries it is the law of nationality that has shaped
immigration law. By contrast, in England it is immigration control
considerations in the post-war period that have determined the development
of the modem nationality law. This is such an oddity that it is worth
commenting upon in and of itself. Additionally, to the extent that the
movement towards increased stringency in the law has been motivated by
racial considerations, this process also is plainly of interest to lawyers,
administrators, and policymakers who worry about the power of law as an
instrument of discrimination.
Recently the problem has been thrown into yet sharper relief. On the one
hand, in an era of rapid world changes, there has been the collapse of the
Berlin Wall, the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, and the restoration
of self-rule on the West Bank - all of which were momentous and peaceful.
On the other hand, there has been inter-ethnic genocidal warfare in both
Bosnia and Rwanda, leading to an exodus of refugees on an unprecedented
scale. Amid all this, the right of a State to control the movement of people
within its borders is still ironically being regarded as axiomatic. For Britain
the "new world order" has provided a problem which is once again
quintessentially the product of its Empire and once again of principle and
legality. This time it comes from Hong Kong, which will reach a head in
1999. This article takes this as a timely opportunity to discuss the importance of nationality law, both nationally and internationally, and argues for
a more robust role to be played by international law.
II.

BACKGROUND

By the Joint Declaration of 1984, Britain,1 in anticipation of the expiry
of its lease over Hong Kong in 1997, agreed with China to give up all its
claims to sovereignty over Hong Kong in return for China's promise to retain
capitalism there for at least fifty years. Not that China is likely, given
present trends, to kill the goose that lays the golden egg. No agreement was
reached between the two countries on nationality, but there was an exchange

1. Joint Declaration of the Govt. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland and the Govt. of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept.
26, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1371 (1984).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/1
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of memoranda. Britain declared that all British Dependant Territories
Citizens (BDTCs) in Hong Kong would lose their status in 1997, but that a
new "appropriate status" would be created. This would be the British
National Status (Overseas),2 permitting requests for consular protection,
which the BDTCs could apply for. No discussion has taken place in England
about the status in law of this new form, or about the general wisdom of
introducing it. However, some of the difficulties inherent therein took little
time to surface.
On June 4, 1989, after the British Government had brought these changes
about, the Chinese authorities brutally suppressed pro-democracy student
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. This promptly raised doubts
in the minds of the people of Hong Kong about Chinese guarantees in the
settlement of 1984. An exodus began to take place from the colony at the
rate of 55,000 people a year. The British Government retracted. It passed
the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 19903 conferring upon a select
minority an automatic right of abode in the UK because their presence was
crucial to the continued prosperity of the colony. The Government, therefore,
hoped that if this skilled and highly qualified minority were made secure in
the belief that they could, if they wished, exercise their right of abode, they
would not wish to leave for the time being. The retraction was, thus, one of
form only, not of intent. By contrast, the Falkland Islanders were all given
actual citizenship after Argentina invaded them in 1982 and, in any event,
retrospectively to the commencement of the British Nationality Act 198 1,4
in the British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983. The difference could
not be more stark.6
Nationality law, therefore, continues to awkwardly intertwine itself with
immigration law and vice-versa. But what will happen in 1999 when Hong
Kong reverts back to China? What will happen if the right of abode is then
actually exercised as it once was by the East African Asians? Then the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968' was rushed through Parliament to
curb the exercise of legitimate legal rights by a State in respect of its own
citizens. Could the same measure be repeated again for the people from
Hong Kong, or would international law intervene to declare this illegal?
These questions have not been faced. They should have been, for they will
have to be at some time in one form or another.

2. See How the Special AdministrativeRegion will be Organized,THE FINANCIAL TIMES
LTD., Sept. 27, 1984, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
3.
4.
5.
6.

British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1990, ch. 34, Sched. I (Eng.)
British Nationality Act 1981, ch. 61 (Eng.)
British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983, ch. 6 (Eng.)
See SATVINDER S. JUSS, IMMIGRATION, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP 56-57 (1993).

7. Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, ch. 9 (Eng.)
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Nationality has long been a concept in international law. It is high time
that it was recognized that as such it is too important, especially in the
changing conditions of the modem world, to be left to the mercy of nation
States where today, in many cases, nation States themselves are undergoing
fundamental change. Old national alliances are breaking down and new ones
are springing up. In Europe, the notion of Community sovereignty has begun
to replace national sovereignty, and it may well be all too easy for some
governments in these circumstances to take maverick action and justify it as
a manifestation of their statehood. This essay offers some tentative views on
an area of law that has been neglected. It should also help to put the
problems arising from Hong Kong into focus.
Nationality law, despite being a concept of international law, is a matter
that traditionally individual States have decided for themselves. The concept
of nationality concerns one of the elements of statehood, which is the
definition and circumscription of the population of the State regarded as the
aggregate of its subjects. On this point, the views of international lawyers
provide some interesting insights. As James Crawford explains, "Nationality
is thus dependent upon statehood, not the reverse." 8 Put in this way, its
importance to sovereign States becomes crucial. A State is not sovereign if
it does not have exclusive competence in respect to its own internal affairs
and nationality is one of those affairs. Technically, a State may therefore
exercise any power over its nationals, wherever they may be. It may delimit
its group of nationals. It may determine their status by determining their
rights and duties. As Paul Weis states, the determination of nationality by
a State "is a concomitant of State sovereignty" because "sovereignty, in its
modem conception, is described as the supreme and independent authority
of States over all persons and things in that territory; independence and
territorial and personal supremacy are considered as the elements of
sovereignty." 9
But what of immigration and expulsion of nationals and aliens by a
State? This exercise of State power is obviously germane to the plight of the
people from Hong Kong. The answer given by another international lawyer,
Goodwin-Gill, is that "[i]t is still common to find expressed the view that
such matters are for the local State alone to decide, in the plenitude of its
sovereignty."'10 This is because the corollary of the independence and
equality of States is the duty on the individual State not to interfere in the

8. James Crawford, The Criteriafor Statehood in InternationalLaw, 48 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 93, 114 (1978).
9. P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65

(2d ed.

1979).
10. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF. PERSONS
BETWEEN STATES 51 (1978).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/1
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internal affairs of other States. Those matters that fall within their internal
affairs are said, as Brownlie observes, "to be within the reserved domain, the
domestic jurisdiction, of states."'" Brierly specifies these as such "noncontroversial matters as a state's choice of constitution, its right to regulate
immigration, tariffs, naturalization, and the like. ..." He is quite emphatic
in his view that "[t]hese are domestic questions which probably not even the
most ardent internationalist, unless he were entirely devoid of a sense of the
practicable, would propose to remove from the sole jurisdiction ....""
These are sentiments, however, that were expressed a long time ago, and
in any event before the Second World War and before the setting up of the
most important of all international institutions, the United Nations, and the
signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, these
sentiments are qualified by the rider "non-controversial." What happens
when these very matters that Brierly specifies become controversial?
One is bound to say either that the matters cease then to be purely the
concern of national States, or that the traditional doctrines of statehood,
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction themselves admit of exceptions under
international law as it would apply to the current conditions of the modem
world. This is because, as we shall see, it is not the traditional view certainly as far as nationality law is concerned. It is anathema to the notion
of the independence of States and could be a recipe for disaster itself. Yet,
at the same time, it must not go unrecognized that the concepts of
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are themselves fluid and indeterminate.
Goodwin-Gill puts it well when he stated that "it is practically impossible to
define sovereignty in isolation from any particular context .... 3 For his
part Brierly wrote that "little seems to be generally known" about domestic
jurisdiction "except its extreme sanctity."' 4 Eduard Hambro was no less
disparaging when, in linking the two concepts together, he referred to the
doctrine of domestic jurisdiction as "one of the last refuges of the dogma of
absolute sovereignty."' 5 It is clear, therefore, that before we deal with the
issue of nationality law in the modem world, we must dispose of the notions
of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction as obstacles in the attainment of a
coherent set of generally agreed principles on nationality law.

ed. 1990).
12. J.L. Brierly, Matters ofDomestic Jurisdiction,6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 8, 13-14 (1925).
13. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 10, at 52-53.
14. Brierly, supra note 12, at 8.
15. M.S. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION I (2d ed. 1961).
11. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 291 (4th

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty, as every constitutional lawyer knows, is a vexatious dogma.
It can mean any number of things in any number of different contexts. It
first had its origins in the political developments of the Middle Ages in
Europe when at the time the Pope was supreme in spiritual matters and the
Emperor in temporal matters. At first, therefore, the concept could not
flourish, but then in the sixteenth century individual States challenged the
authority of the Pope and the Emperor, asserting "independence from their
supremacy in spiritual and temporal matters."' 6 Austin thus spoke of
sovereignty as being the supreme authority in an independent political society
that was essentially indivisible and illimitable. Yet, it is now clear that it is
both divisible and limitable. Sovereignty is limited externally by the
possibility of a general resistance, and internally it may be limited by the
very nature of power itself.
This suggests that sovereignty may have a national as well as an
international dimension. Historicafly, the concept of national sovereignty has
been important to England, particularly to the Tory Party which associated
Parliamentary sovereignty - borne out of the "Glorious Revolution" and the
English constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century - with English
nationalism, both of which it combined together to pitch against Europe.
After all, English identity had finally taken shape and come into its own only
during this time, when after opposition to Catholic Spain, France, and Ireland
in the sixteenth century, England finally, in this century, saw the triumphant
emergence of Protestant Englishmen and Ulstermen. Roman authoritarianism,
from anywhere in Europe, would no longer be tolerated. British national
sovereignty, so hard won, was not, therefore, something that would be easily
surrendered. This domestic conception of sovereignty is something that
international law recognizes, but the problem that it may now pose in the
twentieth century is also well recognized. In the words of Oppenheim:
The question which is now confronting the science of law and
politics is how far sovereignty as it presents itself from the point of
view of the internal law of the State, namely, as the highest
underived power and as the exclusive competence to determine its
jurisdictional limits, is compatible with the normal functioning and
development of International Law and organisation. 7

16. Id. at 1-2.
17. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 122-23 (8th ed. 1955) (italics added).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/1
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Set against this there is, of course, the international conception of
sovereignty. Kunz says this of sovereignty:
Sovereignty, as a basic concept of present international law, as a
legal concept, is a bundle of competences conferred by international
law. Any a priorior unlimited political concept of sovereignty must,
with inescapable logic, lead to the non-existence of international law
as law. Sovereignty is, therefore, essentially a relative notion; its
content depends on the stage of development of international law. 8
For international law, therefore, sovereignty as an attribute of statehood
is a quality which is both ascribed and delineated by the rules of international
law and is wholly dependent on the development of international law. But
for municipal law, sovereignty is directly linked to the independence of
States and as such espouses the doctrine that it cannot be subject to any
external interference. Yet a closer analysis still shows that there are in actual
fact greater affinities between the two than is commonly assumed. For
example, Jean Bodin, one of its earliest exponents, while defining sovereignty
as "the absolute and perpetual power," nevertheless, held it to be bound by
divine law, and others like Grotious, Vattel, Pufendorf, Hobbes, and Locke
allowed for similar limitations. 9
Once one accepts that sovereignty has limitations and that absolute
sovereignty is a misnomer, the problem of sovereignty vis-d-vis international
law disappears, provided that as Van Kleffens states it is not made extinct
through integration with an international organization that is "(i) total or at
least so extensive that such sovereign rights as the participants retain amount
to very little; (ii) irrevocable; (iii) unconditional."2 ° Subject to this there is
as Brierly states, "no mystery about the source of the objection to obey
international law," because "the same problem arises in any system of law
and can never be solved by a merely juridical explanation." As he explains,
The answer must be sought outside the law and it is for legal
philosophy to provide it. The notion that the validity of international
law raises some peculiar problem arises from the confusion which
the doctrine of sovereignty has introduced into international legal
theory. Even when we do not believe in the absoluteness of state
sovereignty we have allowed ourselves to be persuaded that the fact

18. J.L. Kunz, The Nottebohm Judgement, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 536, 545 (1960) (italics
added).
19. RAJAN, supra note 15, at 1-20.
20. Id. at 26.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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of their sovereignty makes it necessary to look for some specific
quality .... "
If sovereignty can be so debunked, what about the doctrine of exclusive
domestic jurisdiction?
IV. EXCLUSIVE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION
The expression "domestic jurisdiction" currently appears in Article 2(7)
of the United Nations Charter but its original basis was in the League of
Nations. 2 It was the Covenant of the League of Nations which permanently established the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction in international law
as it is understood today and invoked by States.23 It was the Covenant
which in erecting a body such as the League of Nations, as a standing
organization with compulsory jurisdiction for the conciliation of disputes,
raised the compelling issue of the limits of international jurisdiction. 4
However, in view of the importance that has subsequently been attached to
the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, it is ironical that the issue was not a
predominating one during the drafting of the Covenant. This was so, save
in the case of the United States. Had it not been for the insistence on this
matter by the United States, the Covenant might well have been signed
without any reservations being made to the League's conciliation jurisdiction.
In the 1919 debates leading to the rejection of the Versailles Treaty, the
Covenant was attacked continuously as a threat to national sovereignty.
American leaders were less concerned with determining such abstract issues
as the boundaries of national and international law than with securing a
continuing guaranty for such delicate domestic interests as a restrictive
immigration policy and a protective tariff.25 Accordingly, the United States
proposed that certain matters of domestic jurisdiction should be reserved from
the conciliation jurisdiction of the League. A new clause, under paragraph
8 was attached to Article 15 which read:
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is
found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international
law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the party, the
Council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the

21. Brierly, supra note 12, at 14.
22. Helen Hart Jones, Domestic Jurisdiction- From the Covenant to the Charter,46 ILL.
L. REV. 219, 219 (1951-52).
23. See, e.g., C.H.M. Waldock, The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction Before International
Legal Tribunals, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 96, 100 (1954).
24. See Jones, supra note 22, at 219-36.
25. Id. at 221-22.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/1
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Assembly.

It was the reference in this paragraph to matters of domestic jurisdiction
which gave credence to the belief in 1919 that there was, in international law,
a reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. But the effect, in practical terms,
of this new theory differed little from the old habit of States to rely upon
matters which affected vital interests, honor, independence and so forth. For
the pre-1918 tendency among States to include under such formulas those
matters which, by their very nature, required domestic control, was merely
perpetrated under the new guise. In practice such phrases as "vital interests
and honor" which precluded States from renouncing their exclusive
jurisdiction over certain matters persisted in the new form. There was,
however, a major difference in the formulation of the new phrase. This is
explained by P. Weis who wrote that "Article 15(8) of the Covenant
constituted... a highly important step forward in so far as it made the
determination of matters of domestic jurisdiction subject to the criterion of
international law, whereas previously each State used to consider itself the
sole arbiter as to what matters were to be regarded as affecting its honor and
vital interests. 27
Indeed, as a direct result of the historical background of these provisions,
Article 15(8) in terms emphasizes a concept of domestic jurisdiction in
international law, but it does not give a list of matters to be so regarded. As
a result, as Lawrence Preuss noted,
Matters of domestic jurisdiction do not qualify themselves. Their
boundaries are traced by international law, and it is surely a
preeminently legal question whether, in any given case, a matter
which belongs in principle to the reserved domain has, as a result of
the development of international relations ... entered the domain
guaranteed aufond by international law. This is a legal question to
which a tribunal, if given the power under a system of compulsory
adjudication, can always find a legal answer.28
James Garner stated it even more succinctly when he declared that "[i]t
is one thing to recognize . . . the right of every sovereign state to determine
freely its own domestic policies; it is a wholly different proposition to
maintain that a state is the sole and exclusive judge of whether a particular

26. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, 8 (italics added).
27. WEIS, supra note 9, at 67.
28. L. Preuss, The International Court of Justice, the Senate, and Matters of Domestic
Jurisdiction,40 AM. J. INT'L L. 720, 726-27 (1946).
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policy or question is purely domestic ....
The conclusion that is, therefore, inexorably reached by Waldock is that:
In general, it seems that the doctrine of the reserved domain, as a
limit upon the jurisdiction of legal tribunals, is both artificial and
destructive of the avowed object of the acceptance of their jurisdiction.. .. It tends to give an air of respectabilityto what is nothing
more than a refusal to allow international obligations to be judicially
enforced by a spurious appeal to constitutional doctrine. If given
wide scope it tends to emasculate the vital principles of international
law that a state may not plead its own domestic law - including its
constitutional law - as an excuse for not performing its international
obligations.3"
This must mean that the exchange of memoranda between Britain and
China, whereby all BDTCs in Hong Kong would lose that particular
nationality status after 1999 and have no right to travel to the UK must be
highly questionable in international law. 31 Like its precursor, the British

Nationality Act 1981, which in Section I(i) abandoned the jus soli rule,
which contains the basic principle of nationality that birth within the territory
of a State makes one a national of that State,32 this law also encourages
statelessness and denies an individual the essential benefits of nationality to
a State. Likewise, this too can be ill-defended by any plea of domestic
jurisdiction, and this is so even if a particular right is not included in the
Charter of Human Rights.
For example, Article 11 of the International Bill of the Rights of Man
state4 that "[e]very person shall be entitled to the nationality of the State
where he is born unless and until on attaining majority he declares for the
nationality open to him by virtue of descent., 33 Lauterpacht says that this
is binding on the laws of municipal States, because "[a]lthough an International Bill of the Rights of Man is not specifically referred to in the
Charter, it has been treated as inherent in it. In fact, the proposal for an
International Bill of Rights
was put forward already in the course of the
34
drafting of the Charter."
Clearly, therefore, like municipal State sovereignty, the doctrine of
exclusive domestic jurisdiction is also a misnomer, given the expanding

29. James W. Garner, The New Arbitration Treaties of the United States, 23 AM. J. INT'L
L. 595, 598 (1929).

30. Waldock, supra note 23, at 142 (italics added).
31. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
32. British Nationality Act 1981, ch. 61, § I(i).
33. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 315 (1950).

34. Id. at 273.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/1
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canvas of international law. Any matter is only within the purview of
municipal State jurisdiction, because international law allows it to be. But
if this is so, is that not just the case with the determination of nationality law,
and if so, cannot Britain decide just as it will in relation to its Chinese
nationals in Hong Kong?
V. NATIONALITY LAW
The proposition that municipal law governs nationality appears for the
first time around the end of the nineteenth century in the works of such
writers as Blunschli,35 Cogordan,36 Rivier," and Weis.3"
The full
implications of this view were not, however, explored by these writers - the
conflicts between the various nationality laws being regarded as exceptional.3 9 The disparity in nationality laws between States reflected the de
facto position in law which emphasized the fact that the determination of
nationality was a matter for individual States alone. Thus, Weis wrote in
1890 that "[t]he State is the master, and has the absolute right to decide by
law the rules which it intends to apply to the acquisition and to the loss of
nationality."4 ° Despite Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of
Nations recognizing the role of international law, this view persisted in the
writing of eminent international lawyers well into this century.
Manley 0. Hudson remarked that "[i]n principle, questions of nationality
fall within the domestic jurisdiction of each State."'" Oppenheim noted that
"[i]t is not for International Law but for Municipal Law to determine who is,
and who is not, to be considered a subject."42 On the other hand, Schwerzenberger observed that "[i]n principle, every Sovereign State is free to
determine for itself to whom it wishes to grant nationality." 43 W.E. Hall
wrote: "It follows from the independence of a state that it may grant or
refuse the privileges of political membership .... Primarily therefore it is
a question for municipal law to decide whether a given individual is to be
considered a subject or a citizen of a particular state.

44

J.H. Ralston also

35. BLUNTSCiiLI, DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFIE 364 (1874).

36. COGORDAN, LA NATIONALIT AU POINT DES RAPPORTS INTERNATIONEAUX 7 (2d ed.
1890).
37. 1 RiVIER, PRINCIPES DU DROIT 303 (1896).
38. WEIS, TRAiTI ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 7 (2d ed. 1980).
39. See part I SIR JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (1910).
40. WEIS, supra note 38, at 7.
41. Documents of the Fourth Session including the Report of the Commission to the
GeneralAssembly, [1952] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1952; see also
HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (3d ed. 1951).
42. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 643.
43. 1 GEORG SCHWERZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (1949).
44. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (8th ed. 1924).
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acceded to the fact that "citizenship" is "not a question of international
'
law."45
G.H. Hackworth in his phenomenal work on nationality began by
saying that "[n]ationality is a subject primarily of municipal as distinguished
'
from international law."46
In the preface to his first edition, P. Weis noted
that "[a]ccording to the unanimously accepted view, the determination of
nationality is a matter which falls within the domestic jurisdiction of each
State and is regulated by its municipal law."4' 7 Parry likewise stated that
"the principal, if not the only rule of international law respecting nationality
is frequently, though perhaps erroneously, understood to be that the determination as to who are and who are not its nationals is a question exclusively
within the domestic jurisdiction of a State." '
This last designation by Parry, amongst the myriad of others quoted
above, is however, far more revealing than the others in its accuracy to the
true position. Parry recognized that the traditional view, cited "frequently"
is held "erroneously," and thus effectively refuted the notion ofjurisdictional
exclusivity over matters of nationality law. Even the other observers are
inclined to speak of municipal States as "primarily" having jurisdiction in
nationality matters. Parry's view is closer to that of Lauterpacht who wrote
that "matters of nationality are, subject to the international obligations of the
State, left to its municipal law."4 9 But the point was even more robustly
made in the Editorial of the New York University Law Review in 1956 which
asserted: "That all matters pertaining to nationality are not matters of
domestic law is well settled."5 Also, in 1927 Fischer Williams argued what must be an unassailable point - that "it is just as much an international
question to what state a man belongs as to what state a territory belongs."'"
Thus we come full circle. The same point made repeatedly, repetitively,
and persistently soon leads one to wonder whether the same notion can
become so denuded as to have any meaning at all. If there is no consensus
as to whether jurisdiction over nationality law is exclusive, then what is the
theoretical basis of the doctrine of exclusive domestic jurisdiction, and what
is its relevance here? The answer is that the doctrine was not created
specifically to provide for individual States to acquire jurisdiction over their

45. JACKSON H. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 160
(rev. ed. 1926).
46. 3 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 220, 1 (1942).
47. WEIS, supra note 9, at preface to the first edition.
48. CLIVE PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CrrIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 10 (1977).
49. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

300 (1933).
50. See Cecil J. Olmstead, 1955 Annual Survey of American Law - InternationalLaw,
31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1956).
51. John Fisher Williams, Denationalization,8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 45, 51 (1927).
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nationality laws, but rather, the jurisdiction already existed by virtue of the
sovereignty of States in matters integral to their statehood, and nationality.
Therefore, defining and circumscribing the population of a State was felt to
be one matter that was within that reserved domain. This can be
demonstrated by a historical analysis which shows that nationality was not
a sine qua non for the existence of an area of domestic jurisdiction.
Thus prior to the construction of the doctrine of exclusive domestic
jurisdiction as a distinct doctrine of international constitutional law in article
15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations,52 the idea of an international jurisdiction in the affairs of States had little significance, because the
international community existed under a decentralised constitution. If there
was any jurisdiction exercised by international organs it merely took the form
of diplomatic exchanges between the States concerned, in which each State
was its own judge. In such a situation, a plea of domestic jurisdiction was
not really a jurisdictional plea. It was effectively a denial of the admissibility
of one's opponent's claim. In this pre-League era, international law did,
however, play a regular part in one particular field. This was in the matter
of arbitration.
In theory, the principle of obligatory legal settlement of disputes was
accepted and endorsed by States. However, in practice the role of international law remained restricted even in this field. States did not commit
themselves in advance to submit their disputes to arbitration or, if they did
in a treaty on arbitration, they added reservations which left them free, when
a dispute arose, to arbitrate or not, depending on whichever of the two suited
them.
Indeed, the German delegate at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907
expressed the view that treaties of arbitration were obligatory as long as there
was no dispute, but became optional as soon as one arose. It was standard
practice with regard to arbitration treaties to exclude from the obligation of
arbitration any matters which affected vital interests, independence, and
honor, and so forth. A reservation in these terms had two effects. It was
broad enough to embrace what States regarded as being matters of domestic
jurisdiction, and equally importantly, it left the decision as to what matters
fell within this domain entirely in the hands of individual States. The result
was that a State that wished to avoid arbitral proceedings could simply
invoke its reservation of vital interests, honor, and so forth, and refuse to
arbitrate, without relying specifically on a domain of matters of domestic
jurisdiction.
The reason for the reservation clauses being shackled in subjective

52. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15,

8; see also supra note 26 and accom-

panying text.
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language was that in the 19th and early 20th century there was a conception
of arbitration which asserted the absolute rights of States. 3 For voluntary
arbitration to work, a theory of sovereignty was necessary, for only then
could it be argued that there existed a community of independent and legally
equal members. Yet sovereignty also meant retaining an ultimate choice of
action and refusing, if a particular State thought fit, to become bound in
advance to follow a designated course of action. How could the idea of
obligatory arbitration be reconciled with the possession of inalienable
sovereign rights? The answer lay in the notion of implied reservations
discussed above.
Nevertheless, one area where the doctrine of reserved domain did
establish itself was in respect of claims before arbitral tribunals for injuries
to aliens. A number of the early treaties on arbitration were concluded
specifically for the settlement of claims for injuries suffered by nationals of
one of the contracting States for which the other State was allegedly
responsible. By the time that the Covenant of the League of Nations was
signed in 1919 the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction had become permanently
established in international law as it is understood and invoked by States
today. States still acted in ways that best protected and promoted their
interests, but this was now reflected in the language of the Covenant. A
despatch sent in 1925 by the Government of New Zealand to the Home
Government contained the following extract indicating their fear of being
deprived of their ultimate choice of action, but couched this time in more
modern language. Once again, the subject was immigration and nationality:
Whatever the jurists of Geneva may think, the law advisors of the
crown in New Zealand believe that there is grave danger that the
Court of International Justice at the Hague, consisting mainly of
foreigners, might hold that the New Zealand law is contrary to the
comity of nations, and that the New Zealand system is not a question
of merely domestic jurisdiction. And our law advisors believe that,
if a question arose for determination under the protocol, the
permanent court might decide: firstly, that the right of foreigners to
reside in New Zealand was not a matter exclusively within the
jurisdiction of New Zealand, and secondly, that as a matter of
international law we must admit them or reduce the restrictions on
their admission. 4

53. Robert R. Wilson, Reservation Clauses in Agreements for Obligatory Arbitration, 23
AM. J. INT'L L. 68, 71-72 (1929).
54. Quoted in LAUTERPACHT, supra note 49, at 150-51 (italics added).
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It can be seen from this that there is, therefore, no inherent mystique
about domestic jurisdiction, and still less so about nationality law being a
matter that inherently falls under such jurisdiction. To demonstrate this point
further we must look at some examples.
VI.

THE TUNIS AND MOROCCO NATIONALITY DECREES AND THE
NOTTEBOHM CASE

The cause cglkbre on the relativity of so-called jurisdictional exclusivity
is the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees in 1923. 55 This concerned a
dispute between Great Britain and France over a provision in the French
Decrees that were promulgated in 1921 in Tunis and the French zone of
Morocco.
Britain objected to these Decrees, because Britain said that their effect
was to convert certain British subjects, namely, the children of British
subjects born in the zones and who were resident in Tunis and Morocco, into
French nationals. Britain felt that both Tunis and Morocco were territories
where His Majesty exercised jurisdiction, so the action by France was in
violation of international law and comity. France's view was that questions
of nationality were too intimately connected with the constitution of a State
and that if Britain insisted on referring the dispute to the Council of the
League, France would rely on the reservation of domestic jurisdiction in
Article 15(8) of the Covenant.
After further discussions, it was decided to ask the Council to request the
Court for an Advisory Opinion on the question of whether the dispute was
or was not by international law solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. In
answering this question the Court drew the distinction between the accepted
and acknowledged competence of a State in a certain field, with the question
as to whether in exercising her competence the State was bound to have
regard to extraneous matters. In a revealing statement, the Court declared:
The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question- it depends
upon the development of international relations. Thus, in the present
state of internationallaw, questions of nationality are, in the opinion
of the Court, in principle within this reserved domain.
For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to observe
that it may well happen that, in a matter which, like that of

55. Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees (U.K. v. Fr.), 1923 P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4
(Feb. 7).
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nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law, the
right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States. In
such a case, jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the
State, is limited by rules of international law. Article 15, paragraph
8, then ceases to apply as regards those States which are entitled to
invoke such rules . . . . To hold that a State has not exclusive
jurisdiction does not in any way prejudice the final decision as to
whether that State has a right to adopt such measures.5 6
Waldock considers that "the conclusion was really inevitable that the
boundary of the reserved domain of each State both changes with any
development in general international law and is affected by the particular
theory of law of that State. 57 But the ruling had important implications.
The Advisory Opinion by the Permanent Court brought the problem of
domestic jurisdiction into its proper perspective as never before. The result
was that when the Charter of the United Nations was drafted in 1948, Article
2(7), which replaced Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
omitted any reference to international law and replaced the word "solely"
with "essentially" in respect of jurisdiction. Article 2(7) of the Charter reads:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any State or shall require the members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter ....58
The question that now arises is whether this new provision materially
affects the relationship between the sphere of domestic jurisdiction with
international law as laid down in 1923. Most modem writers do not think
so. Waldock believes that "[t]he criterion of the scope of the reserved
domain under the Charter must still be found in international law and the
only relevant inquiry ... is whether international law contains any criterion
determining the matters which are in essence matters of domestic jurisdiction. 59
Waldock next makes the important point, however, that the Charter
provisions on human rights are treaty provisions, thus the treatment by
member States of individuals, whether nationals or aliens, within that
jurisdiction is a matter of United Nations concern.6 ° So what are these
provisions that have such an impact on domestic jurisdiction? Chief amongst

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 24.
Waldock, supra note 23, at 110-11.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7 (italics added).
Waldock, supra note 23, at 129.
Id. at 129-31.
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them is Article 55 which reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, the U.N. shall promise:
a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
economic and social progress and development;
b) solutions of international, economic, social, health and related
problems; and international, cultural and educational cooperation; and
c) universal respect for an observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.6 1
This is followed by Article 56 which solemnly adds that "all members
pledge themselves to take joint and separateaction, in co-operation with the
organisation, for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. "62
This direct terminology places a clear and undoubted obligation on every
country that is a member of the U.N. to abide by and uphold the standards
specified in Article 55. The effect of this terminology on exclusive domestic
jurisdiction is that, as Brownlie states, Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter "is
probably in substance a restatement of the classical rule., 63 Brownlie also
feels that "the Liberal practice under Article 55 and 56 of the Charter could
drastically change the concept of domestic jurisdiction. The extent to which
'defendant' states can now rely on some type of formal interpretation of
Professor Higgins goes further still
Article 2, paragraph 7, is in doubt."'
and states that "the claim ... that human-rights questions cannot be
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction ... seems justified, for Articles
55 and 56 impose specific legal obligations by which all states are bound,
Article 2(7) notwithstanding. 65 In the same way, O'Connell considers that
Article 2(7) has, in practice, been emasculated, because member States have
been induced to conform to the United Nations' policies when they are not,
in strict law, required to conform. 66
The human rights limitation, however, is not the only limitation that
States need now concern themselves with. We have so far only looked at the

61. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
62. Id. art. 56 (italics added).
63. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 552.

64. Id. at 553-54.

65. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED STATES 128 (1963).
66. D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (2d. ed. 1970).
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constraints existing within the notion of domestic jurisdiction. However,
there also is a constraint inherent in a conception of nationality law itself as
propounded by international law. Despite the Advisory Opinion in the Tunis
and Morocco Decrees case that "in the present state of international law,
questions of nationality are ... in principle within this reserved domain, '
it appears that international law does have a view as to how and to what end
the concept of nationality law may be employed. This is seen in the
Nottebohm Case6" in 1955, where the Court first defined nationality and
then proceeded to prescribe a limitation to it. The Court defined nationality
as "a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence
of reciprocal rights and duties."'6 9
This would surely mean that the Hong Kong Chinese have a "genuine
connection of existence" with Britain in the same way as the Falkland
Islanders do. The Court then correspondingly prescribed a limitation by
saying that States are under no duty to recognize a nationality acquired by
a person who has no genuine link or connection with the naturalising State
- although this has been criticized.
Nottebohm was a German businessman living in Guatemala for thirtyfour years. When the Second World War broke out, Guatemala sided with
the Allies and Nottebohm applied for the nationality of Liechtenstein, a
neutral country. This could not be granted unless an applicant was resident
in Liechtenstein for at least three years. However, this condition was waived
under a provision of the Liechtenstein Nationality Law of 1934. Nottebohm
paid substantial fees for a Liechtenstein passport. Nevertheless, when
Nottebohm returned to Guatemala in 1940 to resume his business activities,
he was interred as an enemy alien and his property expropriated under a
retroactive Guatemalan enactment. When the war ended, Liechtenstein
demanded that Guatemala provide restitution and compensation for all the
unlawful measures taken against its national. However, the Court held that
the unilateral act performed by Liechtenstein did not warrant recognition.
Yet the irony was that under German law Nottebohm lost his German
nationality when he applied to be naturalized in Liechtenstein. The decision
has been criticised on the grounds that:
Until now, it had been sufficient for the claimant state to prove that
nationality had been conferred by means of a valid act in accordance
with municipal law. The existence of a bond between the state and
67. Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees, supra note 55, at 24; see also supranote 56
and accompanying text.
68. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).

69. Id. at 23.
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the individual was required only when a person concerned possessed
a second nationality, or when the state asserting the claim made
someone its national without his consent, or when the circumstances
under which the nationality was granted violated settled usage on the
international level, accepted as law.7 °
Yet the Court reached the decision that it did because, as we have seen,
it did not feel that naturalization was granted to Nottebohm in accordance
with the generally recognized principles of international law regarding
nationality. Rightly or wrongly, therefore, international law had a conception
of nationality which it applied in this case. It had a view as to the basic
purposes that a law on nationality should serve. The matter has been
expressed more clearly by P. Weis:
Once municipal law . . . takes away from the meaning given to

nationality, according to municipal law elements which are essential
under international law, such municipal law is inconsistent with
international law: its definitions of nationals must be disregarded
when the nationality status of an individual has to be determined for
the purpose of international law.7
In this sense international law has a primacy and pre-eminence that
overrides the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of a State to determine its
nationality. This primacy was recognized most clearly by Oppenheim in the
first edition of his book on international law in 1905: "Thus a person
naturalised in a British colony is for all internationalpurposes a British
subject, although he may not have the right of a British subject within the
United Kingdom itself."7 2
This is especially apt because this, after all, is what will happen to the
Hong Kong Chinese. Yet as Oppenheim explains, for all international
purposes all distinctions "between different kinds of subjects have neither
theoretical nor practical value."73 Except, of course, where a change is
made pursuant to a treaty obligation. For it must be true that just as the
Court in Nottebohm held that a unilateral act in the grant of nationality could
not be valid, so also must a unilateral withdrawal of nationality be invalid.
Indeed, Cordova, who succeeded Manley 0. Hudson as special rapporteur for
the International Law Commission on Nationality, made the following observations in his first report which are worth quoting at length:
70. See InternationalLaw - Limitation on the Right of a State to Claim Diplomatic
Protectionfor NaturalizedCitizens, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1137 (1956).
71. WEIS, supra note 9, at 6-7.
72. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 348-49 (1905) (italics added).
73. Id. at 349.
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International law sets forth the limits of the power of a State to
confer its nationality. This power necessarily implies the right to
deprive an individual of that nationality; consequently international
law may also restrict the authority of the State to deprive a person
of its own nationality. There are cases in which international law
considers that a certain national legislation is not legal because it
comes into conflict with the broader interests of the international
community.
In the present state of international law it is not, therefore,
unwarranted to affirm that the right of an individual State to legislate
in matters of nationality is dependent upon and subordinate to the
rules of international law on the subject, and that, therefore, these
questions of nationality are not, as has been argued, entirely reserved
for the exclusive jurisdiction of the individual States themselves.74
The Hong Kong Chinese are having their status of nationality withdrawn
or altered for the worse in a way that cannot be valid under international law.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

This is an area of much ambivalence and antithetical doctrines.
International law must make its position abundantly clear. It must forge
ahead. It must not hold back. It must be enforced. The problem of
statelessness has been such in the modern world that its "very urgency and
acuteness ' 75 prompted the early insertion of Article 15 into the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948 that states that "everyone
and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived
has the right to a nationality,"
76
of his nationality.,
International law has tried to make some progress through treaty
provisions adopted at the Hague Codification Conference in 1930, in Articles
13 and 15 of the Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws,7 7 and in
the Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness. 78 Also, in New

74. Documents of the Fifteenth Session including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly,
[1963] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n
162,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD 1.
75. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7, 27 (1950).

76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 15 (1948).
77. Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr.
12, 1930, arts. 13, 15, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
78. Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, opened for signature Apr. 12,
1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 130.
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York on August 30, 1961, a Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness"
was adopted. But these provisions have not had an impact on the reduction
of statelessness or on the observance of international law norms, because the
prevailing view - bom out of the history of an absolute right of States - has
given primacy to the doctrine of exclusive domestic jurisdiction.
That is a conception the literal meaning of which is ill-suited to this
jurisdiction. As a concept, the notion of exclusivity ought to be formally
abandoned in international law if it has not - as the Nottebohm Case
demonstrates - already been in practice. It is in truth only so-called. It is
as well to recognize, as Brownlie does, the fact that domestic jurisdiction is
not very fruitful and that as a notion in international law the "reserved
domain is mysterious only because many have failed to see that it really
stands for a tautology."80 In reality, it is "a source of confusion" and as
such "it deserves some consideration"8 1 which it is hoped this article has
given. But it is quite inconsistent with the view of the individual in
international law.
The individual is now the subject of international law and not merely its
object. The orthodox positivist doctrine that only States are subjects of
international law is outdated. 82 As Lauterpacht explains, the modem
position has "been obscured by the failure to observe the distinction between
the recognition, in an international instrument, of rights enuring to the benefit
of the individual and the enforceability of these rights at his instance."83
One has only to look at Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter and the requirement
therein of a "universal respect for an observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all ' 84 to see how true this is.
In the conditions of the modem world, where large parts are in upheaval
and where so much is uncertain, this can have very real consequences. As
Brierly stated: "Australian immigration is a matter of domestic jurisdiction,
but so too were the Armenian massacres; and it is preposterous to speak as
though these two matters must necessarily both be dealt with on the same
Writing before the Second World War and before the
principle . ...
U.N. Charter he accepted that even questions of immigration, tariffs, and
naturalization can "shade off into others of a more contentious kind, such as
the treatment of racial or linguistic or religious minorities, misgovernment
producing repercussions in other states, selfish exploitation of undeveloped

79. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
80. BROWNLIE, supra note 11 at 293.
81. Id. at 292.

82.

LAUTERPACHT,

supra note 33, at 6-7.

83. Id. at 27.
84. U.N. Charter art. 55(c); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
85. Brierly, supra note 12, at 18.
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countries,.. and innumerable others. ' 6 In the "new world order" that has
followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the transfiguration of nation States
and the wholesale movements of populations across frontiers demands a
renewed response from international law - not a reassertion of age-old
doctrines of State sovereignty.

86. Id. at 14.
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